Interview with Jon David Glassman

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JON DAVID GLASSMAN

Interviewed by: Peter Moffat

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Q: Mr. Glassman, maybe you could tell us how you happened to come into the Foreign Service?

GLASSMAN: It was my life-long ambition. I used to read Time magazine as a young person growing up. I was fascinated with world affairs so I enrolled in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. I received a Bachelor of Foreign Service degree. Then I became interested in Russian area studies and went to Columbia University where I received a masters degree, a Certificate at the Russian Institute and Ph.D. in 1976. I departed from the Columbia campus in 1968 and joined the Foreign Service. At that point you weren't allowed to go to Moscow for your first assignment. So, despite being a Russian expert, I was assigned to San Jose, Costa Rica. An opportunity to go to Czechoslovakia temporarily, however, came up. But I never went because the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia. Accordingly I ended up in Madrid as my first assignment.

Q: So you were a Junior Officer in Madrid?

GLASSMAN: That's correct.

Q: Which function did you have?

GLASSMAN: I was three weeks in the consular section, six months in the economics section but ended up in the political section for the remainder of my tour. We had two ambassadors there; the first was Robert Wagner, the former Mayor of New York City. He left shortly thereafter and was replaced by a man named Robert Charles Hill who had been a close collaborator of John Foster Dulles and a prot#g# of John Davis Lodge who also had been Ambassador to Spain. We saw a lot of Ambassador Lodge as time went on there.

Q: If I'm correct, Franco finally died in 1975 but you must have been there for shall we say his declining years. What was your impression of Spain at the time?

GLASSMAN: Franco was preparing for the succession so he opened up the political process for what he called associations as opposed to political parties. A number of semi-democratic politicians began to emerge. He also decided to bring back Prince Juan Carlos to be his successor. You may recall the true successor to the Spanish throne was Don Juan who lived in Estoril in Portugal. He was considered unreliable and somewhat of a leftist so Franco had taken Juan Carlos and put him in a lot of Spanish Military Schools. He was considered a person who might be malleable, might be brought into Spain as a potential successor and would not be a danger. I should say that also in the embassy we had the same impression of Juan Carlos, because he had a U.S. Army man who was his karate instructor and the idea was they were going to bring Juan Carlos back into Spain and perhaps bring the karate instructor along with him and this would be a source of continuing influence. There also was a Spanish military man named Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was Franco's Prime Minister. He was also considered to be an important person favoring U.S. interests in the transition. Franco would phase out, Juan Carlos would be brought in as a kind of entity who would reign over this and then Carrero Blanco and the military would be key figures running the country. There was also a group of economic ministers associated with Opus Dei, the Catholic lay movement, and they

were called technocrats. They were very much partisans of the Western economic model so you would have a transition from a fascist corporate state to modern capitalism with the military backing up the alliance with the United States. You may recall that we had air force bases and naval bases in Spain, including a nuclear submarine base at Rota. We had Torrejon Air Base just outside Madrid and Zaragoza from where U.S. strategic bombers could reach the Soviet Union. So, it was a very tight relationship. The U.S. 16th Air Force headquarters were in Spain at that time. Because of its air and naval strategic roles, Spain was considered to be very important to the nuclear balance of power. Accordingly, the transition from Franco was quite sensitive.

Concerning Prince Juan Carlos, there was some controversy about whether he would be merely a symbolic figure. Ambassador Robert Hill thought that Juan Carlos would be a strong ruler. If I can recall an interesting anecdote, I was asked to write a paper on Juan Carlos as a potential ruler. I and the other political officers thought that Juan Carlos would reign but not really rule. In those days, the embassy didn't work on Wednesday afternoon so Ambassador Hill asked me to stay late. I was sitting in the embassy waiting three or four hours and the embassy was just empty, quiet, no one there. Then about six o'clock, Hill called me into the front office and he said, “You just made a terrible error.” I said, “What is it, Mr. Ambassador?” He said, “This paper you've written says Juan Carlos will reign and not rule.” He said, “I can tell you that's false.” I said, “How's that, Mr. Ambassador?” He said, “Well, I was down at the Cortes (Parliament) and I saw how Juan Carlos walked. He had the walk of a ruler and if you look at his blood... You haven't mentioned anything about his blood. He has the blood of Polish kings, of French kings - all strong rulers.” He said, “You must mention his blood.” I said, “Yes sir, Mr. Ambassador. I'll certainly do that.” So, I went back and rewrote an airgram - actually said that Juan Carlos was likely to be a strong ruler. Among the things I mentioned pursuant to the Ambassador's instructions, was his blood. We sent it in to George Landau, who was then the Country Director for Spain and Portugal. He came back and said, “Are you people insane?” The Ambassador, indeed, held strong views and he thought Juan Carlos would

be a good ruler. In fact, notwithstanding the somewhat eccentric basis for his conclusions, Ambassador Hill was correct in asserting positive views about Juan Carlos' potential.

Q: Were you able to form effective opinions on how the embassy functioned from your relatively low position? Obviously you dealt with the Ambassador.

GLASSMAN: Oh, yes, it was very interesting. Hill was very much an absolutist. He wanted to impose his personality on the embassy. We would have country team meetings. Hill would insist on having his staff meeting in the auditorium, in which would participate not only the section heads, but every officer and every secretary, every American there. So, we would have these large staff meetings in the auditorium and then Hill would call up the heads of section to stand in front of the crowd with him. Then he would proceed often to humiliate them in front of the crowd. This was his technique to maintain control. He also had some, of course, close confidants. One of them was a man named Harry Bergold, who later became an Ambassador. Harry had been also the assistant of Wagner, who was a liberal Democrat. Hill was a right wing Republican. Harry readily changed his perspective. He would come over, have drinks with Hill every night at the residence, which was attached to the embassy. That would be a sort of inner circle, then Hill would have the larger staff meeting in a way I just described. He would also bring in guests from the States such as Ambassador John Davis Lodge, and Holmes Alexander, the columnist. They would also speak in front of the entire embassy staff. One instance I remember was when John Davis Lodge was there. He had been an actor who had played in the film the Scarlet Empress (about Catherine the Great). He styled himself as a great authority on Russia.

Another thing Ambassador Hill did, he would have a weekly football games flown in by TWA. All officers had to assemble every Friday afternoon to watch the football games together and Hill would have a running commentary on the game while this was going on. This was his absolutist style.

Q: In Madrid during the time of student demonstrations around thworld did any intrude on your life in Spain?

GLASSMAN: American students would frequently come and hold demonstrations outside the embassy. Ambassador Hill requested on one occasion that the police arrest the students. We tried to reason with him, saying that all these students, as reprehensible as they might be, have congressman back home and this would be a very troublesome thing. So Hill reluctantly agreed finally not to have the police used against the students and had them instead come in and speak to him. Of course, Hill hated the demonstrators.

I remember he also would go back to the States during the time and see the demonstrations occurring. He would then hold his typical large embassy staff meeting and commiserate over the bad situation in the U.S.

Q: You were then transferred to an area of your greater expertise - Moscow - but one that was also under something of a dead hand politically at the time. Did it live up to your expectations when you went in 1971?

GLASSMAN: In those days we all lived in diplomatic apartment buildings. All the foreign diplomats, including Eastern Europeans, lived there. The first year we were out at Leninsky Prospekt 93, which was at the edge of the city. Every morning when we got ready for work we would see eight to 10 Soviets leave the building. They would have live electronic monitoring in those days. When you would leave the building, perhaps to take a walk, they would start telephoning your wife and so forth, and doing all kinds of things. In the first six months we were there, we would get phone call provocations and threats. It was a rather tense time in the States because the Jewish Defense League was persecuting the Soviet diplomats here. So, in retaliation, the Soviet KGB would do things to us and threaten us. They would also follow and surveil us.

We were often followed very closely when we traveled. I visited 17 provincial cities. We would try to engage in conversation with people on those trips but we would try to choose the people with whom we would talk, rather than allowing the KGB to set up our encounters. We would go sometimes to public parks and sit down with people and just try to talk about what was going on in the city. We would also go out and buy books. There was a person - a publications procurement officer - who would buy books from provincial publishing houses. We would go with him on trips and frequently on the trips they were watched very closely. Sometimes there would be sixteen people in different teams of four and several cars that would follow us. When we would go in the bookstores, they would come very close sometimes, really close, and lean up against us to intimidate us. They would also sit down at tables in restaurants with us. Once my wife and I were at a restaurant outside Riga - a place called the Yuras Perla Restaurant. We had made reservations late in the day so they had placed some KGB people at our table. They had not used their English speakers - it was too late in the day. I could, of course, understand everything they were saying in Russian. They were saying that they had to engage us in conversation and, if it wasn't worthwhile, they would wait for us down at the train station. So we got very nervous of course and quickly departed for the train station with them in hot pursuit. Those kinds of things would happen. Once, I was down at Dushanbe, Tajikistan. I and the other officer in the room were sleeping and then a crack of light appeared at the door. Two people walked in. I yelled in Russian, “Get out of here!” We then walked out to the woman who was the duty officer at the hotel. She said, “It was just a couple of drunks walking in.” The Soviets would do things like this. People would go on picnics and Soviet girls would enter their tents. All kinds of provocations would occur. That was the atmosphere of the times - very tight, very suspicious.

Q: Remind us who your Ambassador was at that time?

GLASSMAN: That was Jacob Beam, a 40 year veteran of the Foreign Service. I recall a terrible instance for him. He once called a staff meeting and was almost in tears. “What's

wrong, Mr. Ambassador," we asked. He said the most terrible thing had happened to him, Henry Kissinger who was the President's National Security Advisor had come to Moscow but did not inform the Ambassador. Kissinger was engaged in the back channel contacts then.

About that time, the famous Moscow Summit of 1972 was held. Nixon came and there was quite an interesting little scene there. They had divided the American delegation and they put Secretary of State William Rogers in the Hotel Rossiya. Kissinger and Nixon stayed at the Kremlin, which isolated the Secretary of State from this. I was on duty one night at the Rossiya and received calls from the Nixon entourage people like Dwight Chapin who later became famous in Watergate. Chapin brusquely ordered the Secretary of State to go immediately to the Kremlin - it was clear that Roger's status was very much subordinate.

Q: That was a pattern that continued all through the Kissinger years.

GLASSMAN: I'm sure it did. Kissinger came to Moscow several times. I remember meeting him at the airport. He thought we were the Russians, we all wore these fur hats. He said, "Thank you for your hospitality comrades." We said, "We're from the embassy." He turned his head and quickly walked away - he was really quite something.

Q: Were you privy to any of the Nixon Summit doings?

GLASSMAN: Not the substance. As a junior officer, I mainly partook of the wonderful food the Soviets put out during the time of the visit. Notwithstanding the historical significance of this period - the dawn of detente, a number of amusing incidents took place. Nixon wanted to give a present to Brezhnev and so he gave him a Cadillac. Brezhnev was so reckless he broke a windshield, and we were always bringing him spare parts. Another interesting thing happened during the Summit, again sort of revealing. The Soviets would not allow Nixon to use Air Force One for internal flights. When Nixon departed for Kiev, the Soviet leadership put him on an airplane and lined up to see him off. They were standing there on nationwide television and the plane wouldn't start up. So a terrible thing took place. Soviet

Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko had to go up on the Aeroflot plane and tell Nixon he had to get off. A replacement plane had to be towed in, oranges and other special items unloaded from the first plane. Of course, television coverage ceased immediately.

Q: As an excellent Russian speaker, were you able to integrate intany social life, local life, or was it really artificial?

GLASSMAN: We would go around and speak to people in these provincial towns. You would discover very interesting things out there. Once, when we were down in Donetsk in the Southern Ukraine, we were sitting in the park one day chatting and we heard rock and roll music on a transistor radio. I said, “This is amazing, you know, I didn't realize the transistor radios could pick up short wave broadcasts.” “That's not short wave. It's a local station,” a local resident said. It turns out there were amateur radio operators broadcasting in the Soviet Union. This was the first idea we had that people were starting to generate their own autonomous non-regime cultural activity.

We also, on another occasion, got on a train and were talking to some of the Soviet troops who had just gotten back from Germany - very interesting. We were able to report on popular points of view and also on emerging attitudes in Central Asia. I had my own special hobby, collecting Soviet Military books, not only current ones but also old ones. Every weekend, I would have a regular routine - I would go to the Military book store and to used bookstores. I accumulated a superb collection. I had almost every Soviet military book published from the 1920s onward which I subsequently gave away to Harriet Fast Scott who was sort of an expert on those things.No one in the embassy, believe it or not, was reporting on arms control in those days. So, even as a humble consular officer, I was able to start calling at the USA Institute and at IMEMO (the Institute of Economy and International Relations). I spoke with their arms control people, many of whom were retired Soviet military people. This worked out very well - it was the beginning of the so-called Mutual Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Subsequently, the State Department established a permanent arms control position reporting at Embassy Moscow.

Q: You then went to Harvard to continue this interest in arms control?

GLASSMAN: The Council of Foreign Relations was kind enough to give me a grant to write at Harvard. I joined there with Professor Paul Doty, who began the Program on Science and International Affairs, a program which focused on arms control. I started to do some writing and in October 1973 war broke out in the Middle East. Professor Doty sent me out to Israel to do some interviews, particularly regarding the Soviet role before and during the war. I did further research and wrote a book called Arms for the Arabs. The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East which is basically a record of Soviet weapon supplies before the three wars in the Middle East (the 1956 Suez war, 1967 Six Day war, and the 1973 October War). The bottom line of the book is that the client (in this case, Egypt) pulled the Soviets toward ever greater involvement in terms of the quality of weapons they provided and in terms of threats to enter the respective wars. You may recall that, at the end of the 1973 war, the Soviets not only threatened to intervene but also permitted or actually fired Scud missiles - the same ones we saw recently in Iraq. What I talk about in the book is the function of the Scud as a regionally strategic weapon. It was not strategic in the sense that the United States and Soviet Union could have been threatened, but because its range allowed it to target the vitals of the Middle Eastern antagonists. Accordingly, it could drag the Soviets and, also of course, the Americans, into protecting their respective clients in those contests. That was one of the things we would see later on as we would go through the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets would become involved in these regional contests and basically drag themselves into confrontation with the United States.

Q: How was the book received?

GLASSMAN: Among the three people who bought it, it was nicely received. But what it did was attract some people in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into getting more interested in regional things. I was asked to join them and we started working on European regional arms control, particularly on control of theater nuclear weapons. The arms control

agency was headed by Dr. Fred Ikl# who was a realist; many considered him a hard liner. He was advised by Paul Wolfowitz, who later became Under Secretary of Defense. Dr. Ikl# was less interested in limiting arms and more in limiting the suspicions that might lead to war. He was more interested in Open Skies and measures that would prevent crises than limitation of arms. This was another alternative way of going about arms control.

Q: Could you tell us your position at this time?

GLASSMAN: Right, I was a regional analyst and I was asked to look into the status of the respective forces in Central Europe. I was also asked to participate in so-called environmental modification talks, which led to the so-called En Mod treaty. This again was another alternative to hard arms control limitation of weapons. Dr. Ikl#'s idea was that we should move in areas that at some future point, perhaps 30-50 years in the future, might represent threats, try to foreclose the threats now and avoid limiting our current capability while we were engaged in Cold War with the Soviet Union. We went over to Moscow and participated in negotiating a treaty which is still in existence which prevents use of climate modification as an instrument of war. That means, for instance, reversing the course of the rivers in Siberia to prevent a warming in the Arctic ocean which could change weather patterns and things like that.I also went down to Antarctica. We have a treaty to prevent Antarctica from being militarized so to make that treaty a real treaty, we would inspect foreign bases periodically. I went down as part of an interagency team and we visited the bases of Argentina, Chile, Britain, Soviet Union and made sure that they were weapons-free. The Soviets had an interesting field tank farm which was sufficient to refuel a lot more than what they had there. People thought they had established the base so that in event of a global war, they would have sites in the South Atlantic to refuel their ships.

Q: What was your impression as to the role of ACDA at the time? Wait considered heavyweight?

GLASSMAN: No, Ikl# was put in there by Kissinger as a kind of gesture to the right wing. He was basically cut out; the way it would work structurally is that we wrote memos to the Director (Dr. Ikl#) who, in turn, reported to the Secretary of State (Kissinger). Kissinger was running his own foreign policy and kept Ikl# in for symbolic reasons but ACDA wasn't intended to be a serious operation. You may recall later when the pressure in Congress on Kissinger became greater, some of the people, Wolfowitz and others, participated in alternative intelligence analysis of Soviet forces - the so-called team B exercise and so many of these people who were in ACDA achieved greater influence later.

Q: I imagine you returned to the Department later with some pleasure to get back into the bilateral Soviet-U.S. situation as an advisor to Marshal Shulman and also as an officer in the Soviet Department.

GLASSMAN: Right, at ACDA, it was only possible to influence the Secretary of State indirectly. So I decided to move back to State to the Soviet Desk - EUR/SOV (Office of Soviet Affairs). I was given the arms control portfolio plus the portfolio for Middle East, Africa and Latin America and that was a good thing to get. The Soviets, at that point were becoming more active. This was after you may recall the October war in the Middle East. The Soviets were involved with Angola. Kissinger was confronting them on the one hand through covert actions but, on the other hand, trying to continue detente. Congress was pressing aggressively Jewish emigration.

In order to execute this policy of going in two directions, Kissinger had to maintain centralized control and the way he did this was by naming Hal Sonnenfeldt as kind of a surrogate to monitor all things to do with Europe, particularly the Soviets. On the Asian side, he had Winston Lord handling China. This meant mechanically, any paper we did had to have Sonnenfeldt or his men clear on it. Sonnenfeldt's men at that time were John Kelly, who became later an Assistant Secretary and James Dobbins and another man by the name of Jim Montgomery. We would go up there and every piece would be carefully vetted. This was a bureaucratic vehicle for diminishing diversity and creating a policy

which Kissinger could manage with the least interference as possible from the Department of State as a corporate body.

In those days when Soviets were giving the speeches, the text would come spilling out of the FBIS printers and we would write memos while the text would be coming out. There was a strong demand for our information and analysis, but the Department's impact on Kissinger's policy was minimal.

After we were doing this for a few years, the election took place and Carter was elected. When Cyrus Vance became the Secretary of State, he brought in Professor Marshal Shulman of Columbia University as advisor on Soviet affairs. Since I had been associated with him at Columbia, they made me his personal assistant for the first six months of the Administration. What Shulman tried to do was to divide his time between Columbia and the State Department, so he never became as strong a player as he might have been. However, Cyrus Vance did respect him and sought his advice and counsel. Shulman, you may recall, was sympathetic toward the Russians. He didn't believe in confronting them. He felt that by having an attitude of greater understanding towards them somehow we would get along better with them. When he was absent from Washington, I would have to attend meetings with Les Gelb who is now head of the Council of Foreign Relations, but at that time was a director for Political Military affairs. He began preparing new Administration briefs on strategic arms control with the Soviets. There was some reason that they felt if we proposed really radical arms control reductions on strategic weapons somehow the Soviets would find this congenial and would end the Cold War. This turned out to be a profound mistake and misunderstanding. We, Shulman and I - went to the first arms control meeting in Moscow. Bill Hyland, the President's Deputy National Security Advisor, had remained behind, the Administration was in such a terrible argument on how the arms control proposal would be presented to the Soviets. There was one deep reduction proposal and a much more modest one. There was arguing going on until the very last day. So we went to Moscow and we were taken up to a guest house in Lenin Hills. Hyland finally arrived and brought in the proposal approved by Carter. No one had seen it. All the

Americans were there for the meeting, so Hyland cut the proposal into pieces and divided up these pieces of paper. Everybody in the room was passing around the individual pieces of paper because they were so anxious to see the final proposal. What had been approved was a proposal for deep cuts in strategic weapons. It turned out to be a total failure. Gromyko took offense. It was a terrible thing. The Russians held a press conference and they said this was an absolute total failure - a bad start for the Carter Administration with the Soviets.

Q: How would you characterize the Soviet approach at that time - dithey try to take advantage?

GLASSMAN: They not only tried to take advantage because they felt that somehow they had been confronted; remember in the Carter administration we had the pulling and tugging between Brzezinski with a very hardline policy and Vance on the other side. Vance continued to be influenced by Shulman. So, we had the constant pulling and tugging. On strategic arms, Brzezinski had pushed hard for deep cuts. The Soviets read it as an effort of some influential American circles to confront them. So they began over time to see that Vance and Shulman, who they felt were more sympathetic, were getting the worst of the distribution of power in Washington. So they became more confrontational. More opportunities were presenting themselves in the Third World. The U.S.-Soviet/Cuban surrogate state struggle in Nicaragua had been going on for some time. Nicaragua began to fall apart. The Cubans were drawing in the Russians then, if not materially, at least spiritually. The idea began to spread in Moscow that there were more opportunities out there in the Third World, that the United States was not providing them the trade benefits they thought they would get through detente because of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (conditioning MFN treatment on Jewish emigration). The arms control situation was in a sort of holding pattern because of Carter's attempt to get the deep reductions first, so Soviets began to see the Third World as a place of advantage and this in turn led to further confrontations.

Q: About your reward for all this good work by being sent as deputy for all your work in Havana. This was quite a shift in your career pattern. How did it happen?

GLASSMAN: I had spoken Spanish from my youth and I spoke Russian. At the end of the Ford years and the beginning of Carter, the Administration had had some discreet contacts with the Cubans at the United Nations and other places. As you recall, we had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961. We had abandoned our facilities in Havana and the Swiss had represented our interests in Cuba over the years. Because the Carter group wanted to innovate, they decided they would open a United States Interests Section as part of the Embassy of Switzerland in Havana. I was successful in promoting my candidacy because of my knowledge of Spanish and Russian so I was sent to Havana as deputy. We went in there in difficult circumstances, since we had no housing. We all went to live at the Havana Riviera Hotel in a group of ten people. The head of the mission was a Foreign Service Officer by the name of Lyle Lane, a Latin Americanist.We were asked to begin dangling in front of the Cubans the idea of eventual lifting of the United States embargo on trade with Cuba. When we opened the Interests Section in Cuba, the Cubans told us that their participation in Angola, where they had sent 20 thousand troops and received material support from Soviets, was an exception. This was going to end, it would not be repeated elsewhere. There would be a normal state-to-state relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. What the Carter Administration was dangling was an incentive for that to occur. Once the Cubans were out of Angola, we would resume trade relations with them. My job as a deputy was to begin visiting the various Cuban foreign trading entities, and to tell them that, when the U.S. embargo was lifted, a number of opportunities would open up. We were definitely holding that out as an incentive to the Cubans. We were received very well initially by the Cubans; they allowed us to move back into the American Embassy building - which had been occupied previously by about four Swiss secretaries. They were quick to give us ten houses which we began to restore. They gave us back the Ambassador's Residence which was a magnificent 1930s building. We began to restore all these things. The Cubans were very free initially with access.

(The Cubans control the access unlike any other country in the world where I've served. You could not call for appointments directly to people concerned; you had to solicit meetings through the Foreign Ministry. You had to make an oral and/or written request to them.)

The first three months we were there almost all our requests were granted; we were able to see almost any Cuban official we wanted in the trading entities and the Foreign Ministry and the government in general. Also during these early months, we had a number of congressional visits and these congressional visitors were almost always received by Castro personally.

Castro had a personal entourage. There was one man, Pepe Naranjo, who was only the Minister of Food Industry but was actually a personal friend of Castro. Another friend was Osmany Cienfuegos, the brother of famous revolutionary Camilo Cienfuegos. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was always there - the Soviets' main contact. Also Dr. Jose “Chomi” Miyar [Dr. Jose Manuel Miyar Barruecos], Castro's personal secretary. It was an entourage who was with Castro and he would invite the Congressmen to meet with them. They'd have a reception with this group, talk with them and sometimes he would meet with them alone later. Castro had a very special technique for his personal meetings. He would wait for the end of the visit and he would frequently call people at midnight on the night before they were to leave. The guest would sit for three or four hours talking to Castro. He had a capable staff there, who supplied him with biographic information. They would develop a lot of information which Castro used to flatter these visitors. The Americans would come out with an incredibly favorable impression. Guy Vander Jagt, the congressman, told me after meeting with Castro he felt like a 17 year old girl who on her first date had been seduced and taken to bed. It was an incredible technique that Castro had; it was both intimate knowledge of the person with whom he was talking and then an unlimited store of time. He would talk for hours and hours and then often at the end offer to drive them personally to their hotel. He was very, very seductive in that way.

Q: Anything you can add to the fascination with Castro?

GLASSMAN: Castro was very soft spoken, when you met him. I met him about 17 times. We're used to seeing these television commentaries of him ranting and raving in a public speech but personally he is very soft spoken. He's also good with the ladies; for instance, when there were women there he would often play up to them.Regarding his own situation, Castro lives in a number of houses. When I was there, he lived in eight houses. He would move almost every night. The way you'd know he was in a particular house was by observing the security people around. Then he would move. One of his houses was right across the street from the Ambassador's residence. Castro had one or several mistresses, one of whom was his favorite English interpreter. When we spoke to her about Castro, she would say the man is a God. She and other official Cubans would speak of him as kind of a deity. They would treat him as a deity - in fact as Alexander the Great was treated by his entourage. Castro, they say, tried to cultivate the idea of reasonableness, of softness of character but his basic inclinations were confrontational, particularly with the United States. He grew up in a time when gambling, prostitution and American tourism dominated Cuba. When relations with the U.S. appeared to be normalizing, he would always stimulate a crisis. This is how the intervention of Ethiopia was described to me by members of Castro's personal entourage. The U.S. opened the Interests Section in Havana in August-September 1977. Then, the Cubans and Russians moved into Ethiopia in December - Castro, in my judgment, wanted to prevent normalization with the U.S.

I remember when we first arrived in Havana, we talked to the Somalis. The Somalis were very close to the Cubans and the Russians. All of a sudden the roles were reversed. The Cuban leadership, Castro's entourage, told me that what happened was Castro was fascinated by the Ethiopian revolutionary leader Mengistu. Castro saw him as a man who wore a military uniform, a revolutionary like Castro himself. Castro convinced the Soviets to shift their bets. Whether this is true or self serving is not clear. But what is evident,

is that the prospect for normalization with the United States was there; the Americans opened up in Havana. But three months later the Americans, Cubans and Russians are at each others' throat. Despite the fact that we had dangled all this business about lifting the embargo, and the influx of Cuban visitors from the so-called Cuban community (the Cuban exiles in Miami) which created an inflow of foreign exchange immediately, Castro threw this all to the winds. Whether the Soviets told him to do this, or whether he convinced the Soviets to do this, it's hard to know. But what we do know is that, in December 1977, after we moved in, there was a change in the tone of our relationship with Cuba. After Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, the Carter administration could no longer be dangling the prospect of embargo lifting there. The Cubans, for their part, began to clamp down on our contacts. Pending appointment requests started to build up and by the time I left Cuba in 1979, I had 45-50 outstanding appointment requests which had not been granted. They were really tightening up on us. So to pursue our tasks there, we began meeting more and more with the Soviets and Eastern Europeans and talked about their economic ties with Cuba. But the tone with the Cubans turned to confrontation and Castro had precipitated this. While this was going on in Ethiopia, Castro was also putting money, goods into the support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. At the end of my tour, I had a meeting with Osmany Cienfuegos, a member of the Cuban Communist party Politburo at the time and very close to Castro. He said, “You know, you have seen our hand in Nicaragua and you're going to see it again soon in El Salvador and Guatemala.” He was telling the truth, of course. That was the next phase in the confrontation.

There are those such as Wayne Smith who defend the Cubans but the reality is that the Cubans had a golden opportunity. They had said that Angola would be unique. They had been offered implicitly the lifting of the embargo and yet they moved against U.S. interests. They dispatched troops to Ethiopia. We used to see these troops at the airports flying out there; it was really a rush operation. As the Cubans began to clamp down and close off contact with us, we began to see more and more of the Russians. They were very open about their economic relationship with Cuba. They professed to have a disdain for Castro

but they had a different point of view regarding Fidel and his brother Raul. The Soviets generally would tell us that they considered Raul to be a disciplined fellow whereas Fidel was more emotional and problematical. It was clear that they preferred a succession arrangement in which Raul would take over; he was, of course, head of the armed forces. They would talk, for example, about Raul's wife, Vilma Espin. She apparently in her youth was a very beautiful woman, so they would say, “Why do you think Vilma married Raul as opposed to Fidel the great hero? He had a great future. He was more disciplined.” That was certainly their hope.

In the meantime, whether the Cubans instigated the Ethiopian intervention or the Russians had, the Russians continued to upgrade Cuba's strength while we were there.

One interesting incident happened. I was at a reception once talking to a Cuban, a senior Cuban, he was sort of in his cups. He said, “You know, we have a means to launch a military strike against Washington.” “I said how's that?” He said, “We have an airplane that can fly on a one way mission and bomb Washington.” I said, “What are you talking? He said, “You'll see, you'll see.” So we sent this little anecdote in a memorandum to Washington and got an alarmed massage back. Somebody has to come down to Havana and speak to us personally. So they sent a man down from INR (Dept. of State Intelligence and Research) and he said they had detected a delivery of MIG-23 fighter aircraft. The MIG-23s, maybe would get to Miami, maybe if you had a one way mission it might get up to Jacksonville, Florida. Under certain scenarios, with external fuel tanks maybe a little longer, but perhaps this is what they thought the Cuban was talking about. The Soviets delivered MIG-23s and the reason they were considered particularly dangerous was, not only the interceptor version delivered, but also the ground attack version. They would be used to attack a ground target whether Washington or Miami or whatever. So that was the subject of some concern. The Administration made it public. They didn't know, however, how many of the ground attack and how many of the interceptor versions had been delivered. Finally at a crucial point of the crisis, the Cubans published a photo on the front page of Verde Olivo, a Cuban military magazine, which showed a specific ground

attack version. It has a nose that tilts downward and you could count in the photo how many ground attack aircraft and how many interceptors. This helped defuse the crisis, but what it showed was the Soviets despite all this gossip about not liking Castro and being discouraged by the amount of economic support he required, continued to upgrade his inventory and facilitated actions which were considered as provocative by the United States.

On another subject, when we arrived in Cuba, Castro had a number of American citizens prisoners - many who were involved in early CIA rebellions or assassination attempts and other things. Basically they had been held and sentenced for many years. There was a presumption that when we opened up, Castro would finally have to release some of these American prisoners. He also had some hijackers from the U.S. there who lived freely. They hijacked American aircraft to Cuba. First we started talking to the Cubans about the hijackers, some of whom actually wanted to leave. One of them I remember was named Jesus Garland Grant. He came into the Interests Section and asked to be repatriated to the United States. We were finally able to get him released, and sent him to an American prison. We received a letter later from an American prison thanking us for sending him to a U.S. prison, despite having been permitted to live free in Cuba. This was sort of an interesting commentary on life there. We also, more seriously, had American political prisoners, one of whom committed suicide just before we arrived there. Rafael Del Pino, who had been one of Castro's collaborators during the revolution, had turned against them later. What was told to us was, just before we opened the Interests Section, the Cubans put him in an isolation cell. They began 24 hours a day playing very loud, loud music and drove him mad. Finally he committed suicide just before we arrived. But we had other prisoners there who were alive and we would visit them. Some of the many prisoners were cooperating with the Cuban authorities, some of the prisoners would not cooperate. The Cubans had earlier segregated common criminals and political prisoners. Just before we arrived they changed the regime so all prisoners had to wear the same uniforms. The real hardline political prisoners refused to do that. So they just walked around in their

underwear for years; they were the hardest ones to get out; eventually they were released much later. There was one prisoner who had somewhat cooperated and since wore the uniform - Larry Lunt. He was a relative of the Belgian Royal family actually. He'd been there a number of years and we were able to negotiate finally his release. But a number of other political prisoners remained - we used to visit them at the Combinado del Este Prison and talk to them.

Q: Given your background in Soviet affairs, did you have contactwith the Russians and how many of them were there?

GLASSMAN: Basically our contacts were with the Soviet embassy and economic mission but there were a lot more Russians there. On one occasion, we had a visit from the Moiseyev Ballet. They brought in people from the Lourdes monitoring station where they monitored U.S. communications. They had filled up the auditorium, over 10,000 Russians were there. We essentially discovered after we left a so-called Soviet Brigade. We found the Russians had had a Soviet Brigade in Cuba since after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Q: You moved yet again going to Mexico City; that must have beesomething of a relief after Havana.

GLASSMAN: Right, I was made the Deputy Chief of the political section in Mexico City. I was responsible for Mexican foreign relations in Mexico. One day, I received a call from Washington from the Office of Assistant Secretary William Bowdler. The Archbishop in El Salvador had been assassinated by some people. It was later thought that right wing elements had killed the Archbishop. The leftist groups had become quite active and since I had been in Cuba and had some good rapport there, Bowdler asked that I go to El Salvador and try to find out what these leftist groups were about. We had no contact with them. I flew down to El Salvador one week after Archbishop Romero was killed, was picked up at the airport, driven in at night by some people in the car with guns leaning out, obviously a tense atmosphere.

Through some of my press contacts from Mexico who were there, I asked to be introduced to the leftist groups. I was first taken to the National University of El Salvador. Within days of my arrival, they were announcing the formation of what they called the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front) which was going to be the political front of the leftist groups. I went in and I didn't want to make myself too particularly conspicuous. When signing in I simply wrote Jon Glassman - America. I went in there and I thought I was being very clever until people came up and started photographing me. I thought that was rather strange. The next day the leftist paper, which was the only one there, published my photograph under the title of “CIA person attends the inauguration of FDR.”

Later, as the days passed, we tried to get the word out that we wanted to meet with the leftist people. The leftist groups said they had to consult and subsequently the answer came back a few weeks later. They had a meeting in Mexico among the groups and had decided they would not meet with me unless the United States government made certain concessions such as breaking relations with the Salvadoran government and other conditions that were obviously unacceptable. One of the groups later offered to meet with me separately under circumstances which I thought were rather dangerous. I wouldn't do it but, notwithstanding that, I remained around El Salvador for a few weeks - about six weeks actually and established some contacts with what they referred to as the “progressive” elements of the Salvador military. The military had made a coup against the previous dictator Romero, and there were some military people there we would consider democratic elements. At this time, however, another coup attempt took place led by far right elements led by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson. Because of my contacts with the more moderate individuals in the military, we were able to mobilize units of armed forces to resist the coup. The coup was put down.

The other thing we did on this first trip was to put together the business groups. The leftists had tried to make inroads into particularly small business operations, trying to establish a so-called united front, using some of the things like small bus lines, small shopkeepers

as a means to divide the moderate non-guerrilla groups similar to a tactic they'd used in Nicaragua against Somoza. We organized what we called the Alianza, which was a unit across the business sector oriented against the guerrillas and that pretty much sustained itself so the guerrillas never were able to do what they had done in Nicaragua. Six or so weeks doing that, I went back to Mexico to resume my duties.

Subsequently, in January 1981, the Salvadoran guerrillas launched what they called the “final offensive.” Their goal was to overthrow the Salvadoran government before Reagan's inauguration because they sensed that when Reagan came into power the Salvadoran regime would be backed by the U.S. government. So they should try to achieve immediate success. I believe that on January 16, 1981, the reason I recall this, it was the last National Security Council meeting of the Carter administration, Bowdler's people again called me and said they would like me to go back to El Salvador and find out whether any foreign groups were backing this final offensive. At that time U.S. Ambassador Robert White was still there. He had been there during my first trip and I knew him well, a very active person. He, however, had made a critical error at the Carter-Reagan transition. He had done an interview with Newsweek in which he had condemned Reagan which wasn't good. I went there, White assembled his country team and asked that they help me. I said, “Look, the first thing I'm going to do, I'm going to go visit each of the military and police elements of Salvador and see what they've come up with, what kind of evidence they have re the external ties of the guerrillas.” The CIA station chief said, “Oh, we have very close relations with the General Staff, there's nothing else, nothing to learn.” I said, “Oh, I just want to do it.” So I began calling on people, the Salvadoran National Guard, the National Police, the Treasury Police, the joint staff, the armed forces and one day I received a telephone call from Pat Lasbury Hall, a consular officer. She said she had just come from National Police headquarters; they just made an arrest of the propaganda commission of the ERP (The Revolutionary Popular Army), which was one of the guerrilla groups. She said, “Go on down there - see what's happening.” So I went down to National Police headquarters, went and talked to Colonel Lopez Nuila, who was running the police. He

said, “Yes, we got these prisoners.” I said, “Did you pick up any papers?” He said, “Oh, yes, we have lots of papers, always a bunch of papers.” I said, “Why don't you just give me the papers.” So I just took all these documents and I took them back to Mark Dion's house who was Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission. I started going through the papers. I had seen some reports on captured guerrilla documents in the past and I had read some DIA reports on them. I knew that they used code names to identify places and one of them which I had seen previously was Esmeralda (Emerald). I remembered a DIA report which I had read in Mexico that said perhaps they were talking about an Ecuadorian port called Esmeralda. Maybe this was a place where the guerrillas were bringing in arms but I started reading these documents and I began seeing things which to me were fairly obvious. For instance, the guerrilla documents referred to Lagos - I knew they weren't talking about Nigeria. I knew that Nicaragua has two big lakes - Lagos might be Nicaragua. The Esmeralda thing also began to emerge more and more as a place where a lot of things were going on - movements to and through Esmeralda. The question was what is Esmeralda. I started to read one document, I noticed they had a meeting in Lagos which again, in my judgment was probably Nicaragua with “Comrades from Esmeralda.” They had met with one person called capital letter 'C,' then two little letters 'en,' and then capital 'F,' (C en F) then with another person 'M. Br,' and then another person whose name now escapes me. I remembered that, in Cuba, one of Castro's titles was Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro. I thought, perhaps they're referring to the Sandinista inauguration ceremony that had taken place last year and “C en F” referred to Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro. I did a check and asked, what Cubans had attended Sandinista inauguration ceremonies? Castro, of course, was there, but the way they tipped it off and made it clear was that Miguel Brugueras who was the Cuban ambassador in Panama (M.Br.) was also there. So it was clear that Esmeralda was Cuba and, if you'd backtrack it through all the documents, then you'd see how Cuba stood out. There were documents in there, for example, that showed how the Secretary General of the Salvadoran Communist Party, a man named Shafik Handal, had gone to Moscow and how they had sent him on to Viet Nam. Viet Nam then sent their arms to “Esmeralda,” which sent them to “Lagos.” So what you can see

from these documents, later collected at military headquarters, was a clear picture. What had happened was the Cubans had put together the Salvadoran guerrilla groups. Then they had one of the representative groups go to Moscow, the Russians had told them to go to Viet Nam to get help, the Vietnamese had given them help, they had shipped the arms to Cuba which in turn shipped them to Nicaragua, then in turn to El Salvador.

When I figured this out, this was all on a Saturday, I told Mark Dion. He said, “This is very important, we have to go see the Ambassador.” We went to Ambassador White's residence, he said, “This is fantastic.” He said, “What a Godsend, they're about to remove me as Ambassador for criticism. Now we will send in a cable.” We have discovered that the Cubans are supporting this. You've written up this very factual thing, but I'm going to write the summary of this cable to make it more dramatic, emphasizing the guerrillas contacts with Castro, Yasser Arafat, etc.” So he writes up the summary, gives it to me, we send it in. It's a big thing because, if I'm not mistaken, this was a day or two after Reagan's inauguration. White was to have been called on the carpet the following Tuesday in Washington for his criticism of Reagan. So he got the cable off and he departed El Salvador. Subsequently, I got a few more documents. Basically we had the goods on the guerrillas and this became a very important moment because it turned out that Haig, who had become the Secretary of State days before, had wanted to dramatize Soviet involvement in overseas aggression. This tends to confirm his thesis. White went to Washington but was fired. He wanted to be named Ambassador to Sweden and they said, “No way, we'll send you as Consul General to Bermuda but you'll never get an Ambassadorship,” and he turned sour on the Administration. The reason this is of interest is because he denied knowing subsequently from where I got the guerrilla documents. He, of course, not only knew but wrote the summary on the cable which went in under his signature. Wayne Smith, who we talked about before, was another person who said he didn't know. But of course, he also knew since a cable had been sent to Washington.

After these cables were sent, I collected the documents, and journeyed back to Mexico. I got a call from Washington, saying, “The Secretary of State wants you to come to

Washington and to bring the documents." By this time I'd accumulated about 18 pounds of documents. So I came up to Washington in late January-early February 1981. They'd formed a little working group - INR Phil Wilcox and Luigi Einaudi were there, as were David Simcox and other Foreign Service Officers. They were working up for Haig a Salvadoran White Paper. They wanted to merge information from the documents and previously classified information, and put out an expose. Haig's idea was to spread it internationally to discredit the Soviets and to develop resistance to them. We began assembling the paper but, before it was completed, Haig sent for Larry Eagleburger who was Under Secretary for Political Affairs. "Larry, you go to Europe - meet with the principal Allies, meet with the North Atlantic Council, go to Germany, France, UK at the Ministerial level and tell them what we found and how we have to confront the Soviets in Central America." Since I knew the most about the documents, I was asked to accompany Eagleburger. So Eagleburger and I took off for Europe. This was a pretty heavy thing for me. I was 37 years old and all of a sudden I was having lunch and dinner with the foreign ministers in London, Paris and Bonn. By the time we got to Brussels, however, the basic reaction to the mission was that the Europeans said yes - we don't like the Soviets but the Soviet problem is here, it's in the Middle East, it isn't in Central America.

While we were out there Eagleburger sent a cable to Haig saying that he liked me. Meantime in parallel, I had received an offer to join the Policy Planning Staff at State under my old friend Paul Wolfowitz. And back in Washington the Salvadoran White Paper was being written. The actual people who wrote the White Paper are David Simcox and Luigi Einaudi with inputs from Philip Wilcox. They wrote it in a kind of extravagant language using terms like "this is a textbook case of communist aggression" which infuriated people on the left who thought the Salvadoran rebels were land reformers. We got back from Europe and Haig wanted to hold a press conference to release the White Paper. So they prevailed on me since I knew the most about the documents to go out and be the spokesman. I appeared before the press corps. A number of very complimentary articles were initially written including one on the front page of The Washington Post comparing

me to “Smiley's People.” I was also written up in Time Magazine which I thought was great. But this later proved not to be such a happy experience.

Months passed and the Administration geared up its efforts to help the Salvadoran government. We sent down some military trainers and, unknown to us, a counterattack began to shape up. Obviously our expose was a very damaging thing to the Soviets and Cubans. Number one, what had become public was what was supposed to have been a covert operation. The Soviets were taking the heat for it. The Cubans were taking the heat for it and they didn't like it. Its was causing great problems so certain things began to happen - for instance, the newspaper Excelsior, the biggest paper in Mexico, ran a three part series on me for three days in a row by a man named Manuel Buendia, who was on the Cuban payroll (and was later murdered in Mexico for unrelated reasons). Basically, the Cubans had done great research into my past, they talked about my time in school, they invented a story about my attitudes and this and that, then the bottom line after three days front page story in the biggest newspaper in Mexico was that I was a professor of torture and that I had taught the Salvadorans how to torture to produce the White Paper. This was a total fabrication, of course. I said okay this was an attempt to discredit, but very interesting, it turns out that virtually at the same the story was coming out in Mexico, Philip Agee, a defector from the CIA, then residing under control of East Germany, published a very closed paper which was later published in a book called 'White Paper Whitewash' under Agee's name. This paper attempted to expose contradictions in the White Paper. It was an attempt to divert attention to alleged detailed discrepancies rather than engaging the total picture. When the Agee piece came out, I was totally unaware. I received a call about four or five months after the White Paper in June from a man named Jonathan Kwitny of The Wall Street Journal. He wanted to interview me; fine I'd done many other interviews. He said he wanted the interview to be not for attribution or background. When he came in, he asked me a lot of detailed questions which I responded to. The article appeared on the front page of The Wall Street Journal, criticizing the White Paper. He quoted me as saying that we stretched the facts too far. He used my reaction

to a particular detail to characterize my attitude to the whole product. Haig saw the Journal article and was furious. He wanted me fired as it appeared I had criticized a product I had played a part in producing. I issued a statement that day pointing out that Kwitny had quoted out of context. The Salvadoran White Paper was accurate, notwithstanding the problems we might have with some of its language. The facts were true, the flow of arms had come from Cuba and Nicaragua. Kwitny's story was damaging. The very next day, The Washington Post published another huge article written by Karen De Young and Bob Kaiser attacking details and exposing alleged mistakes. It didn't quote me by name but again pointed out allegedly wrong details. Later we discovered that both the Kwitny piece in the The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post piece by Kaiser/De Young not only borrowed extensively from the Agee piece but used very similar language without attribution. This disclosure appeared in some of the right wing press which documented this. The words were almost identical to the Agee piece. Frederick Taylor, who at that time was one of the editors of The Wall Street Journal, ran an editorial piece saying, “Yes, Kwitny did have access to the Agee piece; he did do it but he paid for xeroxing.” That was the excuse no attribution was necessary because he paid for the xerox copying.

Q: An off the record interview with Mr. Kwitny but you were quoted bMr. Kwitny.

GLASSMAN: Right, it was a violation of the ground rules. Furthermore, it was inaccurate. It was a total misrepresentation. We put out a public statement the very day by the Department press spokesman pointing that out. When I went up for my ambassadorial confirmation hearings Senator Dodd asked about the White Paper. I said, “Both Castro and others have confirmed that they provided arms to the Salvadorans. It is now a matter of public record.”

Q: There must have been more prosaic work in S/P (Policy PlanninStaff).

GLASSMAN: Right.

Q: What were you up to?

GLASSMAN: At that point Haig, in addition to dramatizing the Soviet and Cuban action in Central America, wanted to do something about it. He said, “Cuba was the source of a lot of the problems we were seeing in the world. We must go to the source.” He named Bud McFarlane who was Counselor of the Department, as a point man to do a paper and the object of the paper was to build a case for military action against Cuba, probably invasion. McFarlane, other people in the Department...Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Burt, and others were contributing. The paper never was right, it was done in many, many versions. Finally the CIA took dead aim at the paper. The CIA wanted to make the case that any invasion of Cuba would involve massive American military casualties. They were not the only ones who did not want the invasion to occur. There were differences in the Administration, for instance, James Baker, who was Chief of Staff of the Reagan White House, was very much against the invasion of Cuba, as was Tom Enders who became the Assistant Secretary for Latin America. When we took our trip to Europe with Eagleburger, Eagleburger had talked to Enders about going as Ambassador to Moscow but Haig had called Enders and said, “You should take over Latin America because you're a man who can get things done.” Enders had the mind of a moderate in terms of military action and he also knew that James Baker, the Chief of Staff, didn't really favor it, so he was very much against the McFarlane effort. So you had a kind of internal conflict within the Department with harder elements meaning, Wolfowitz, Burt, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Bud McFarlane, against Enders, with the latter playing up to the Chief of Staff in the White House, James Baker. After many versions of this paper, a decision was made that they were not going to go forward with the invasion of Cuba. Once that decision was made, the effort obviously became the need to contain the Cubans in Central America. Tom Enders became the focal point of this effort. Enders had two aspects of his policy. One, he wanted to generate military pressure against the Sandinistas, who were the intermediate point for transferring the Cuban help to Salvador. The idea would be to set up a military group (the Contras) to apply pressure against Sandinistas. Meantime, he would try to engage in some type of

negotiating effort with them as well. To do both of these things required the approval of Congress.

Enders had interesting ways of carrying out his policy because he wanted to have a great deal of control; he wanted to have some influence in the White House. He started restricting decision making and access to information on the contra track and military track. He formed something that became known as the RIG (Restricted Interdepartment Group) and put his personal assistant Tony Gillespie in charge. The group maintained liaison with the CIA which was represented by Dwayne “Dewey” Clarridge, who was in charge of Latin American things. This became the vehicle through which they would work with the Contras. In parallel, they also began some attempts to negotiate with the Sandinistas. Again there was a split within the Administration. Enders would have been satisfied probably if the Sandinistas had agreed to cut off military support to the Salvadorans which of course they were never prepared to do anyway, since they never admitted that they were providing it. There were others, however, Wolfowitz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, others who wanted the Sandinistas to be removed from power. In other words, restore democracy in Nicaragua. So Enders would pursue his negotiating ploys, then there would be memos to Secretary Haig criticizing Enders's negotiating course. Haig, by the way, while all this was going on, was very suspicious of the White House. He felt that the White House was conspiring against him. I remember several meetings where he would become bright red, beet red, talking about how the White House was trying to undermine him. Another facet of Enders' policy was an economic track - we worked on a Carribean Basin Initiative which was to open the United States market to duty free entry from the Central American/ Caribbean countries, and also to provide some increased aid to account to them.

Enders was an interesting person; he was brilliant and at the same time extremely arrogant and somewhat rude but he liked to have a little interplay and challenge. He would have a staff meeting every day of his country directors in which he allowed me as a representative of S and a fellow named Otto Reich, who was the head of Latin American AID, to attend. We often had policy conflicts with him. We would challenge him in front

of his country directors. He would enjoy it because he was a brilliant guy and liked to put us in our place appropriately. We had some very interesting discussions. He was sort of a giant, he suffered a defeat at one point. During these Nicaragua negotiations, a new team took shape at the White House. A man named Judge William Clark, who had been the Deputy Secretary of State, became the National Security Advisor. He turned against Enders and Enders was removed, replaced by a man named Langhorne “Tony” Motley, who actually continued more or less Enders' policy.

Q: December of 1983 you turned up as advisor to Senator RicharStone. How did that come about?

GLASSMAN: At that point, I was about ready to move over to the Atlantic Council to spend a year. I received a telephone call from Larry Eagleburger and I went over to see him. It turned out that the Administration, knowing that it had to get funding for the Contras had run into problems in the Congress. They didn't have a peace component in their policy, in other words they just had a military component. They named former Florida Senator Richard Stone as a special Presidential envoy but had him reporting to the Secretary of State. This later proved to be rather complicating. What Stone wanted to do was to enlist the Contras in a negotiating mode. They couldn't be just a military organization. They had to have certain political reconciliation aims, then take those peace proposals or plans to the Sandinistas in Managua. Second of all, he wanted to open some contact with the Salvadoran guerrillas or their political fronts. The first thing he did was set up a meeting in Panama where we went down and met with the leaders of the Contras and some of the others and, basically, they indicated their demands - democracy/human rights guarantees. We went to Managua on several occasions and presented them to Daniel Ortega who was then leading the Sandinistas. There were no positive signs on the part of Ortega, he wasn't prepared to accommodate. We also started to reach out to the Salvadoran guerrillas. That was made possible by President Belisario Betancur of Colombia. He set up a meeting for us in Bogota with Ruben Zamora, who was one of the political front men of the Salvadoran guerrillas. We met with him, a meeting, a dramatic thing, and set up a later

meeting which took place in San Jose, Costa Rica with the heads of the various guerrilla political fronts. The meetings did not achieve any substantial progress. In those meetings, the Salvadoran representatives, the guerrilla representatives, remarked to me, “You did those articles about us, you did the White Paper and used our documents.” There was no give on the parts of these people while we were negotiating both with the representatives of the Salvadoran guerrilla political fronts and also with the Sandinistas. There was a lot of tension within the Department because Langhorne “Tony” Motley, who had taken over Latin affairs, wanted to also pursue his own negotiating. In fact, he was prepared to move a little beyond Stone in terms of concessions to the Sandinistas.

Stone and I at one point, were down in Buenos Aires attending the presidential inauguration of Alfonsin. George Bush was there in fact as the United States Representative. We were going to head up from there to Caracas for some meetings with the Venezuelan government. Then we were going into Managua for another session with Daniel Ortega. We went into the Embassy in Buenos Aires on Monday and were talking to John Bushnell who was the Deputy Chief of Mission. When we told him we were heading up to Managua, he said, “That's funny, Tony Motley was heading there himself. How can that be?” We called the National Security Council and they didn't believe it. We said, “This must be a mistake.” We put in a call to Larry Eagleburger. I said, “Larry, we understand Motley is headed for Managua.” He said, “I don't know anything about it.” So we flew up to Caracas and we called Eagleburger. He said, “Yes, well it turns out Motley is going in there.” We said, “How can he go there when we're going to be there in two days to conduct negotiations?” He said, “Well he's going to do it.” This is happening; we have to make the best of this. Stone decided to cancel the trip to Nicaragua because he presumed correctly that Motley was putting other things on the table. How can you come in with a different program, so we went back and said, “This is just unacceptable. How can you be trying to do something like this?” The Department said, “Well it will never happen again.” It continued to happen and it became clear that Motley was proceeding with his efforts to negotiate with the Sandinistas at the time when Stone was supposed to be doing the

same thing. So one day Stone went to Secretary George Shultz and said, “Mr. Secretary, either you restrain Motley or I resign; here's my letter.” So Shultz said, “I have to think about this.” We went on the road again. I think in Caracas we got a message, which said Shultz had accepted Stone's resignation. Stone called Bud McFarlane, “Hey sorry, I didn't know that, Shultz jumped the gun.” Stone was basically hung out to dry in that case and Motley basically took over the lead negotiating. An interesting episode of crossed wires and crossed intentions and how a Presidential envoy becomes undone.

Q: The Stone episode had led you to some broader conclusions whawas going on?

GLASSMAN: Right, the prime emphasis on the Stone mission was to ensure that congressional funding continued for the Contras. That's not to say that the Administration wouldn't have accepted the peaceful conclusion if the Sandinistas had stopped helping the Salvadorans and transformed their internal structure. But that clearly wasn't in the cards and in fact did not come into the cards until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the inability to get outside support. The Stone mission was a needed component but the reason it didn't prosper was because both the Soviets and Cubans were willing to back the Sandinistas in their effort to undermine El Salvador. The United States was unwilling to intervene directly with its own troops. We provided training, unarmed trainers but were not willing to intervene with our own troops and unable to give sufficient help to the Salvadoran armed forces so they could prevail militarily over the guerrillas. The deeper lesson in terms of bureaucratics, of course, is that you have to have a coherent policy in which you don't have two elements trying to negotiate with a foreign government and, if you're going to have a presidential envoy, you have to identify very clearly where the reporting responsibility lies so there's not a competition between the Secretary of State and the White House to run these sorts of things.

Q: Then you were suddenly without a job.

GLASSMAN: Yes, we disbanded Stone's office and I was then asked by a political fellow who was going to be named Ambassador to accompany him as Deputy Chief of Mission. This became impossible because at that point I was under rank for a senior officer's position. Secretary of State Shultz, however, said, “Well we can't break the system, can't make him a DCM but we should do something for this fellow.” So they made me Country Director for Australia and New Zealand, which was thought to be a nice quiet backwater, but, fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, New Zealand at this point launched its so-called “nuclear ships policy” under which they prohibited the entry into New Zealand of either nuclear armed or powered ships. This was a big challenge to the United States Navy because in terms of weaponry at least at that point, we followed a policy which we did not declare whether ships had nuclear weapons on board. “No confirm, no deny policy,” I think it was called. This was a challenge to the United States Navy because of our neither confirm or deny policy which allowed the Navy to maintain access in states such as the Scandinavians, Japan and others which would not permit entry of declared nuclear weapons. New Zealand had an importance to the United States particularly the Navy that went beyond its locality. It was a question of our global ability to project power with ships which might have on board nuclear ammunition, mines, torpedoes, bombs.

What happened was an effort to negotiate New Zealand back from this ban. New Zealand sent to Washington Ambassador Wallace “Bill” Rowling, who had been a former Prime Minister. We developed with him a possible negotiated settlement under which we would try a gradual return to access allowing less difficult ships in first. That is, ships that clearly didn't carry nuclear weapons and then building up step by step. There was a sense that the New Zealand Government might accept this and we dispatched a ship to New Zealand called the USS Buchanan. The New Zealanders appeared ready to accept but Prime Minister Lange, after dispute with the Labor Party caucus, turned it down. So at this point, we were in a state of confrontation with New Zealand. Later Lange was brought to Washington, where he met with Weinberger and Shultz. Weinberger particularly pressed Shultz to be very hard. Again the lower level bureaucracy was willing to do a

step by step type of approach, but Shultz, at Weinberger's urging, was tough. (Although Shultz and Weinberger fought on many occasions they were of one mind.) Shultz said, “No way - we're not going to accommodate you at all.” At this point, decisions were made to undertake sanctions against New Zealand. The reason this was interesting and controversial was New Zealand and Australia were allies of the United States - a defense Alliance which had existed since the beginning of the Cold War years, part of the chain of alliances circling the globe. They cooperated with us very closely. We shared most of our intelligence with them, at the same level as closest allies such as Britain. We had defense exercises with them. They were an integral part of the Western defense community. So before invoking these various sanctions, we had a secret meeting with Prime Minister Lange. With me was a Foreign Service Officer named Bill Brown who later became Ambassador to Israel. He and I went to Los Angeles and met with Prime Minister Lange at the home of the Consul General of New Zealand. We read off to him the sanctions that would be taken against New Zealand if they persisted in their policy - including comprehensive cut-off of intelligence, an end of all defense cooperation, joint exercises and sharing of defense technology. While we were there Lange kept staring over our heads, we couldn't understand what was happening. Lange was a very fat man, he probably weighed about 250-300 pounds and we couldn't figure out why he kept staring over our heads. We turned around and there was a plate of pastries on the shelf. Lange was very dismissive of these sanctions. He said that, if he didn't get intelligence, it's more time to read the comic paper when he is sitting in Parliament. He said these things don't interest him at all. Meanwhile back in Washington they brought in some people from the Prime Minister's office in New Zealand who had been involved in the intelligence exchange. The Agency brought them over and one man whose name now escapes me, when told about the sanctions, began sobbing. These senior New Zealand people had been very much involved from the beginning in inter-allied cooperation.

It was felt at that time, however, that the sanctions had to be spelled out very clearly, not so much because of New Zealand's policies, but to give a lesson in Europe and Japan

about what happens if they precluded the entry of the so-called nuclear ships. Finally the meeting we had out in California with the Australians; we reached an agreement with the Australians who were pushing us very hard to take action against New Zealanders because the Australian Labor Party felt that this could be very contagious within their own party if New Zealand policy was allowed to stand without sanction. It was agreed that we would suspend New Zealand from the ANZUS alliance. I think it's probably unique in the history of the broad Western alliance system. At the meeting it was decided that New Zealand was suspended. All the sanctions went into force and held for over a decade.

Q: Must have been traumatic for you.

GLASSMAN: It was interesting, there was a sense that with the embassy here in town we had a relationship working to solve this. Ambassador Rowling was really trying to solve it. Had the Labor Party been as it was before, it would have been solved, but a radical group had taken the party. Lange himself had been an anti-Vietnam war activist, there were people who were very radical and someone who had been tied up with Soviet front organizations who had taken control of the Labor Party. At that point Lange himself was not leader, he felt he had to bend to his own caucus.

Q: Major change of scene in 1987. When you went to Kabul, that waquite a plum as an assignment.

GLASSMAN: I don't know if it was a plum. I volunteered to go and was able to study Dari (Afghan Persian) along with Russian for a year. The idea as you know was to report from Kabul on the Soviet intentions. The Soviets had come in, in 1979 - this is eight years later. They had about a hundred twenty thousand troops in Afghanistan, many of them headquartered in the city of Kabul. The United States and the other Western nations maintained embassies there. They were vehicles for reporting what the Soviets were doing and on the success of the Afghan Resistance. The reason the Soviets allowed the Western embassies to remain was their hope that over time the Western powers would

recognize that a communist regime was permanent, would normalize relations. That was their gain from all this. We went in there and there were about twenty Americans. We were under fire constantly from the Mujaheddin who were bombarding the city with 60 to 250 ground-to-ground rockets a week. In 1985, the United States had provided the rebels with Stinger surface-to-air missiles. They were taking a healthy toll of Soviet helicopters and aircraft. There was a very interesting atmosphere in Kabul. The Soviets would be flying in supplies constantly because the road was often interdicted - they would come in all night. All night long this infernal roar as the Russian planes would come in one after another. They had a sort of AWAC observation plane over the city all night long. In the old Ambassador's residence where I lived, I would lock myself into a steel room every night and then we would radio communicate with the Embassy. Electric power was going out all the time as the Mujaheddin would blow up some of the power plants or power lines but these were always restored. When we arrived there, the CIA told us that the Pakistanis were running the operation and the rebels would finally definitely cut out the electric supplies which they never succeeded in doing. One thing we saw in Afghanistan was that frequently the reports which the Pakistani Army Intelligence Service (the ISI) would convey to the American Embassy Islamabad were much more optimistic than the actual results we could see upon the ground. Nonetheless, the Mujaheddin were exercising strong psychological pressure. We would send in the weekly situation report on the war. The way we were able to do this was we would interview, when I say interview, our officers would go out and talk to Afghan storekeepers and also talk to embassy employees. Because the Afghans had an extended family network, we were able to gain on a weekly basis reports of how the war was going in every one of the provinces and cross check them and we would send in an unclassified report which would go to Islamabad and it would be rebroadcast by both the BBC and the Voice of America into Afghanistan. People who were out there fighting would know how the war was going nationally. The British did the same thing and we would coordinate our reports with them every week as we worked with the other NATO representatives.

Q: When these were broadcast, was there any sort of attribution?

GLASSMAN: No, it just simply said that in, say, Nangarhar province, a Mujaheddin group under Saladin or something, had realized an attack on a Soviet convoy and three trucks were destroyed. In addition to talking to the people we would send an officer out on the periphery of the city where the Soviet bases were and we would report when they were moving out on military operations, in which directions. We would also take photographs of Soviet military equipment. A lot of very dangerous stuff was done there with our people driving in the middle of the Russian convoys. Pulling in the car in the middle and taking photographs of the armor below the view of the driver and some standing at the end of the airport taking shots of aircraft/helicopters landing. So there was a lot of wild stuff going on.

In addition, we talked to the Soviet and Eastern European Ambassadors. At this time, in the late 1980s, a lot of the Eastern European Ambassadors were very independent so they would get briefed from the Soviets and they would provide us detailed debriefing so we were getting a very good picture of what the Soviets were telling their allies.Ambassador Nikolai Yegorychev was the Soviet Ambassador during a great portion of my tour. He was the former First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party. He was a very important man under Khrushchev but had been removed and had been out for a long time, had been brought back in and by this time was a very hard line guy. He was constantly conveying threats that, if the United States continued to supply Stinger missiles, they would take revenge - some patriotic Afghans would shoot down American planes bringing supplies to Pakistan. When an aircraft carrying Pakistani President Zia al-Haq, and American Ambassador Arnie Raphel blew up in mid-air he came to see me, the only time he actually visited the American Embassy. The Soviet Ambassador denied to me the Soviets had anything to do with this. I asked him if the Afghan Communists had anything to do with it. He said, “I don't know.” I can tell you that the night Zia's plane was downed, the Afghan communist troops were celebrating, firing shots across the sky, really

celebrating the death of Pakistani President Zia. They thought this was the key to a future victory.

Q: Could you give us an idea of the size of your mission?

GLASSMAN: Initially 20 people, then we were reduced to ten. As these rockets were coming in, there was obviously fear that Americans would be killed. Sometimes there were some spectacular things happening in the city. Once the Resistance hit the ammunition dump at the airport, a Soviet ammunition dump; we were only a mile away. There was the most incredible explosion you can imagine. Flames going a thousand feet into the air, not smoke but flames, shells exploding and going everywhere. We were all on top of the embassy and the Marines were cheering. I said, “You shouldn't cheer because they're going to start hitting us next.” Washington understood, of course, that our situation was dangerous. It was less dangerous than you might think, however, because the city is six miles wide. So you fire 60 or 250 rockets into the city with kill radius of maybe, say, 30 yards or so and in that six mile-wide city a lot of people will survive. And at no time were any Americans injured while we were there even though we were sitting next to Radio Afghanistan. One occasion I remember we were having dinner in the Chinese Embassy. The Chinese at that point were on our side. We were having dinner for our departing DCM when a rocket hit right next door on the French Embassy. The wife of the Chinese Ambassador leaped to the side of one of our officers but we were fortunate nothing happened. On another occasion, a fight broke out behind the Embassy between the two regime factions. The Afghan Communist troops at the Presidential Palace and their rivals were firing mortars back and forth across the city, just an incredible thing to watch. No one was hurt.

When Bush was elected and was inaugurated, the Soviets had by then signed the Geneva agreement which pledged them to pull out bFebruary 1989. There was fear in Washington that, if we remained, the Mujaheddin would come in and kill all whites including us. Most of us in the Embassy had beards, which distinguished us from the Russian troops. The

Russian troops were only permitted to have mustaches, except for the Spetsnaz, the Russian Green Berets. We had beards to look a little bit different. There was the sense that if the Mujaheddin came in, they would kill all foreigners. So in the meantime, the CIA produced green armbands with the inscription “Allahu Akbar”- God is Great. We were going to wear them, but the Administration got very nervous and finally ordered us to evacuate the post. We were burning all our documents. We arranged for a charter flight from the Afghan communist airline by paying them $10,000. James Baker, the new Secretary of State, said, “It isn't quick enough.” They wanted us to leave more quickly and sent in an Indian Airline plane. When we said we were going to evacuate, our local employees got very upset because they thought they were going to be possibly killed. So we were instructed by the State Department to pay them six months salary (about $80,000), which we paid them and committed to come back and pay them and which people did over the years.

The embassy has been closed since February 1989. When we left, we moved all these special armored vehicles into the basement (the vehicles had port holes for automatic weapons, gas dispensers). We had metal containers made for everyone's possessions and we took them to the airport to meet this Indian Airline plane that was coming in. At the airport, the Afghan Communists were insulting us, calling us cowards and all kinds of things were happening. Finally we loaded our possessions and got on the plane and, after almost running into a Soviet plane coming in, we got out to India. Just before leaving, I had a ceremony at the monument honoring the deceased Ambassador Dubs who had been killed in a hostage taking incident, and I had an American flag walking out and that picture appeared on the front page of The Washington Post. When we arrived at New Delhi Airport, we were going to have a press conference and Baker sent a message saying he didn't want a press conference because he didn't like the photo because it reminded him of Ambassador John Gunther Dean when he had withdrawn from Cambodia carrying an American flag. He said, “It looked like we had surrendered rather than won.” Anyway, we held the press conference. Later, we brought back a flag. We had several flags. One we

gave to Baker, which is still in the State Department, to be returned whenever we go back. I also took one out to President Reagan in California, gave him a flag which had flown on the day of the Soviet invasion and the day when we left which coincided with the Soviet troop withdrawal.

Q: Knowledge of the Soviet Union, and the Russian language helped yoin your time there?

GLASSMAN: Very helpful, we talked to both Ambassador Yegorychev and Vorontsov who succeeded him during this time. The Soviets were also threatening, saying they would not be pulling out but we were able to observe in various ways their preparation for pulling out so we didn't have to believe what they were telling us. Other things happened there; Kabul was a city under siege. Only about eight kilometers, outside the city, there was a place called Karga Lake. The Soviets had a paratroop detachment out there on top of the hill. Below the hill was the old golf course which had been pock marked by rockets and mortar rounds, with holes out there six to seven feet wide. We would go out there just to have a little recreation. Sometimes there would be firefights across the lake with Mujaheddin who were across the way. One time, The New York Times correspondent was in there and he'd been told by Najibullah and the Afghan communist authorities that the war was over. I said, “We'll take you 15 minutes outside Kabul and show you it's not the case.” We went up there, shooting started and he believed us. One time we were up there at Karga Lake and a BBC film crew was being held by Soviet paratroopers. It turned out that this film crew had seen the Soviets fishing in the lake with hand grenades and the Soviets didn't take kindly to that. I told the Soviets that, “These guys will just turn over their video tape and let them go on their way.” and they were ready to do that. I left and came back 45 minutes later and they were still there. The British Charg# d'Affaires had shown up and some other diplomats were there. A Soviet Lieutenant Colonel said, “Look we're going to take these people in to talk with General Varennikov,” who was the head of the Soviet operational group in Afghanistan. He said, “You diplomats get on your way. We're not interested in you.” We diplomats were standing there and said, “No, we don't want the journalists to be taken off separately, we're going to be with them.” The Soviet

Colonel said, “Okay you can be with them, we'll take you all in then.” So he called up three tanks and he lined up all the cars, the diplomatic cars, and then lined up one tank in the beginning, one tank in the middle, one tank in the end, then we start motoring with them. I rode with the Soviet Colonel, who was telling me how discouraged they were in Afghanistan. He said, “We're going to take you to see General Varennikov,” which was great because I had never seen General Varennikov. We went about 15 kilometers around the edge of the city and were off the main road. We came to a high-rise building over there and he said, “Wait here.” We waited there about an hour and then it came down from headquarters that General Varennikov had decided to make a gesture of good will. He decided to release everyone, but this was great because this was the headquarters of the 40th Soviet Army. We, the United States, had never known where it was located. So of course we went back later, took pictures of the approaches. After that, it was under constant attack by the Mujaheddin the rest of the war.

Q: You mentioned Najibullah. Did you have much to do with the Afghan leadership?

GLASSMAN: No, we were banned by the State Department as were the other Western powers from dealing with the Afghan communist government; the position was this is a puppet regime, so the only official contact we were allowed to have was with the Protocol Department of the Afghan Foreign Ministry which would give us customs permits and things like that. We would never talk policy with them at all. Najibullah had been a physician who was in charge of the Afghan secret police. He was reputed to be a person who had developed new techniques to keep prisoners alive under torture and I can tell you that torture was occurring because they had several prisons in Kabul. One was right in the central part of town. You could park outside and hear screaming in the night as people were being tortured. Najibullah was a beastly fellow.

One of the worst things that happened while we were there was, as you may recall, that the USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf had shot down by mistake an Iranian passenger plane. The USG determined that the Iranians had sent out teams to get revenge. One of

the teams was sent to Afghanistan in an attempt to kill us, and we were instructed by the State Department to approach the Soviets for protection. You can understand the irony of this, because here we were paying all this money to arm the Afghan resistance and we had to approach the Soviets for protection. I forget whether Yegorychev or Vorontsov was the Ambassador but they said they would be happy to talk to the Afghan Communist Government, which they did and from then on whenever I went out of the embassy I had to be accompanied by a detachment of Afghan communist soldiers with rifles who went with me. They were on me like glue the rest of my time there.

Q: 1989 showed a real change of paces, you went back to be DeputNational Security Advisor for Vice President Quayle..

GLASSMAN: When Baker ordered us to be evacuated, I went back to the State Department and went to see George Vest who was then the Director General of the Foreign Service and he said, “You did a wonderful job there and I'd like you to choose where you'd like to be Ambassador.” He said, “You think about it, go to Larry Eagleburger and tell him.” So I decided I wanted to be Ambassador to Panama. I went to Larry Eagleburger said that I was prepared to be Ambassador to Panama and he said, “Well I'll talk to the Secretary and call you back.” He never called back. In any event, I received a parallel offer to go over to the White House to be the Deputy Assistant of National Security Affairs for the newly inaugurated Vice President, Dan Quayle, who I did not know. I had never even heard of him. I was in Afghanistan when his nomination was announced. I had to look him up in the biographical book of Senators. I went over to the White House and it turned out to be a good experience because the Vice President had worked on the defense side, held all kinds of hearings on anti-ballistic missile defense and missile proliferation, but never had really worked on the foreign policy side. My job was to suggest with whom he should meet, and to brief him. In the White House, people are very much rushed from meeting to meeting, so often I would only have an opportunity of perhaps five minutes to brief him before a meeting. I found that, based on this very rushed preparation, he could really carry on the conversation, make the points needed.

So despite the reputation of not being a deep thinker, I thought he was quite competent. We had to brief him for his meetings with the National Security Council and prepare and accompany him on trips to about 42 countries. One of the things, thinking about our old acquaintance Daniel Ortega, we were once going to Latin America and Quayle decided to make Latin America one of his causes. We were meeting with President Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela and with Felipe Gonzalez the Prime Minister of Spain. The discussion centered on how to convince Ortega to accept the results of the Nicaraguan election, in which Violeta Chamorro was elected, so we hit on a scheme. Carlos Andres Perez and Felipe Gonzalez invited Ortega on their plane to fly down to a Presidential inauguration we were attending in Chile. We then met with Daniel Ortega down in Chile. He agreed to surrender authority that opened the way to the democratic transition in Central America.A lot of interesting competition going on between Baker who was Secretary of State and Quayle. The latter was a real conservative and Baker viewed him as a rival for the succession to Bush. Accordingly, some of the trips we were planning were constrained. For instance, Dan Quayle never went to the Soviet Union because of objections from Baker. Mrs. Quayle went, but Quayle was kept away from there. Quayle's staff was a little more open to change - he met with a lot of Eastern Europeans who were turning away from communism in the beginning of the 1989 transition. Also Quayle's staff met with some of the Russians closest to Yeltsin. At that point, Brent Scowcroft, the President's National Security Advisor, would not allow Bush or other people to meet with the Yeltsin people. The senior White House team had bet that Gorbachev was going to emerge triumphant. The reason I mention that is that when we went with Mrs. Quayle to Moscow, Mrs. Quayle met with Raisa Gorbachev, Gorbachev's wife. In the course of that meeting, Raisa started sobbing and just broke down completely in the meeting. She said, “No one understands us here in Moscow. They don't understand what my husband's trying to do.” And we of course sent this into the Department as the first indication that Washington would consider credible. Gorbachev was really on the rocks, of course, and was soon to fall, so that was very interesting.

Another Quayle contribution came just before the Europe 1992 exercise. He got Bush interested in the idea of having an economic initiative for Latin America. This became the Enterprise for the Americas initiative which was very far reaching.

Quayle was a good man and was extremely honest. His inclinations were more advanced than those of Scowcroft and Baker. One crisis that has been written about was the Philippine coup attempt. When Bush was heading overseas on a trip and Scowcroft was with him, I went over to a meeting that was taking place in the White House Situation Room chaired by Bob Gates who was Deputy National Security Advisor. A coup was taking place in the Philippines against Corazon Aquino so they were trying to figure out what to do. It seemed to me that with Bush gone we ought to get the Vice President in. So I called him up and he came down and took control of the meeting. In the course of that meeting an urgent call was received, the Philippine air force is about to take off to bomb the presidential palace: JCS chairman, Colin Powell was up on the video conference screen. Secretary of Defense Cheney for some reason hadn't come in. Powell said, “We can establish a cap, we'll send up the American fighters and they could threaten to shoot down any Philippine plane that takes off.” This was a good idea and Quayle, of course, agreed to that. They called Bush on the plane and he agreed as well. Subsequently some people said that Quayle played the leadership role. I can tell you as a witness that Colin Powell had the key idea but Quayle was chairing the meeting. He gave it leadership, he sanctioned the idea and contacted Bush.

Q: A new biography apparently has revealed a recognition at the time by President Bush that he had made a mistake in selecting Mr. Quayle. Did you see any reflection of this? Did you see any of the interplay between the two?

GLASSMAN: On the contrary, I had been told that quote refers to the announcement of Quayle naming as opposed to his selection. The relationship between Quayle and Bush was reasonably close - they had lunch every week faithfully whenever Bush was in the city. They would never miss this. They would have lunch for an hour, hour and a half

and we would prepare Quayle with issues that should be brought up in this presidential meeting. Bush respected Quayle because Quayle had been a Senator, he was the only person at that time in the White House with congressional experience. So Quayle really played a key role in advising Bush on how Congress would react. I remember one instance, for example, when we were advised that support for the Cambodian resistance would not be possible in Congress. Quayle said quite the contrary and he got on the phone himself and started calling people. They came over to our side. Bush certainly had the option of dropping Quayle for the second term, something that was booted around the White House and discussed, but Bush never did. The reason he didn't do it, I believe, was because his initial naming of Quayle responded to the fact that he (Bush) had a reputation of a kind of liberal with the Republican party. He wanted somebody from the right wing and Quayle was that and he was a traditional conservative Republican, very much connected with the pro-life movement and religious fundamentalists and Bush wanted that. He didn't anticipate the negative reaction to Quayle's military service. Quayle became a permanent target. Once that happens, you can't help stepping on land mines. I remember once we were in Chile and we were having lunch in a restaurant and they had some folk dancers down below. I said to the Vice President, “Why don't you come down?” On the way, he and Mrs. Quayle stopped in a gift store and they made jokes about one of these dolls there and this became a cause c#l#bre for them. Ann Devroy, one of The Washington Post correspondents, was there and they played it up. It was just a little joke. The point being, that once you are a target it's very hard to escape from that. Quayle, of course, is a media target but he's a smart man and despite his light blue eyes which some people characterize as deer-in-the-headlights, he's quite clever and he has very good instincts and very good knowledge of the Congress. In my judgment, on foreign trips and meetings with foreigners, he always did the right thing.

Q: Were you able to educate him so to speak on the Foreign Servicand perhaps overcome the resistance he might have had?

GLASSMAN: He was happy with the Foreign Service. Since I was a career Foreign Service Officer, we used the State Department very much. The State Department was the key to all our trips and all our meetings. In order to circumvent the bureaucracy, we often told the desk officers to send to us directly their raw product so we could use it fast. In the White House, there is generally a very bad view of the State Department both for ideological reasons or because they're not quick. This is one of the reasons why the advent of the fax machine gave the White House for the first time a way to circumvent the bureaucracy and use the State Department to full advantage. Quayle generally liked the people. He always took the State Assistant Secretary on board Air Force Two. On the aircraft, there's a round table and, before we would arrive at a location, we'd have the Assistant Secretary, the National Security Council person who handled the region, and the Vice President's staff sit around the table with the VP and discuss what we were going to do at each stop. It worked pretty well.

Q: An even greater reward was your 1991 to 1994 tour as ouAmbassador to Paraguay. How did that come about? Your choice?

GLASSMAN: We were traveling around different places and we came to Paraguay. The Ambassador there had suggested that someone visit because no White House person since Nixon had ever been in Paraguay since the 1950s. There was a great deal of controversy in fact. The CIA came over to the White House and specifically briefed Quayle because the President of Paraguay at that time was a man named Andres Rodriguez who was an Army General. He was generally thought to have been a sponsor/cooperator in narco trafficking. In fact the French Connection (the movie), the Frenchman who was behind that had lived in Paraguay and Rodriguez was accused of having protected him. So CIA came over and said it's not a good thing to go but the American Ambassador said that it's really important to back the transition to democracy. So we went down there and when we went there it was very strange. Rather than having our business meeting in the office, Rodriguez took us out on the Presidential yacht. We're sitting out there in the middle of the

Paraguay river and he had his drug czar brief us on the war against drugs. The drug czar was telling us all the things they were doing and Rodriguez at one point in the meeting became bored and he said that's enough. He said “Mr. Vice President do you know what our policy is towards drug trafficking? The Vice President said, “What is it?” Rodriguez said when we catch a drug trafficker, “We cut off his head. That's our policy.”

So I was sort of intrigued by this rather strange country. I talked to the State Department about the possibility of going there and I was put up by the State Department as a nominee. The White House had another political appointee to be a candidate and the Vice President on my behalf talked to Bush, “Please don't send a political appointee. Jon has worked here, he is a Foreign Service Officer, let him go.” And I was able to go.

When I went up for my hearing, as I mentioned, Chris Dodd was primed on the Salvadoran White Paper. He raised it in the hearings. I cited many quotations from Castro and others saying that they had indeed provided arms to Salvadorans. Senator Dodd said, “Fine.” The Senate confirmed me unanimously, so I went to Paraguay and discovered while I was there a little bit more about the country.

It produced cotton and had an abundance of electric power. One of its primary features is that it served as a kind of entrepot for contraband entry into high tariff countries such as Argentina and Brazil which are its neighbors. One of the principal functions of the military was to protect this traffic and derive protection payments for this. In this contraband traffic, in addition to whiskey, cigarettes, perfume, electronic goods, and computers, we kept hearing persistent reports that narcotics were included. In Paraguay, there's no cultivation of narcotics but it's immediately adjacent to Bolivia which is one of the two principal coca sources in the world, and we of course were trying to press the Paraguayans to control this traffic. They said all the right things, they said they were doing it but we came to notice procedures were notably below that of their neighbors. For instance, one of my years there, the Brazilians seized seven tons of cocaine, the Argentines had seized one ton and the Paraguayans had seized 47 kilos. They were seizing a lot of marijuana which was a lot

less valuable commodity, so we would bring this up with Rodriguez, urge him to cooperate and he would say the right things again but again, but it looked like they were turning a blind eye to the trafficking. We were later to discover exactly how this contraband traffic worked on electronics. They would bring it in from Miami, break it down in smaller loads, drive them out in trucks to the clandestine air strips in the eastern part of Paraguay where they were put in warehouses and re-pack the smaller lots, which were put on small planes which were then going into the outskirts of Sao Paulo and Rio, then transported over to Argentina as well. Now in Brazil the traffickers, Nigerians and others, would then transfer it into West Africa and then move it into Europe as well.

This was an interesting transit route.

Rodriguez, the President, had overthrown the 35 year dictator Stroessner. He had been clearly part of Stroessner's group, one of his daughters was married to Stroessner's son, so the idea that he was making some real change was far-fetched. Because of his tawdry past and possible connection with narco traffic, we thought it would be better if he departed the Presidency. First of all, Rodriguez, of course, wanted to stay on. He tried to delay the election and we organized a sort of campaign which brought in the church and business people who pressed for holding elections on time. We were successful in generating that kind of popular mood, then a constitutional amendment passed, not by our instigation, but preventing him from running again for reelection. He contemplated a coup but didn't do it. Things looked like they were going swimmingly, so the ruling party had a primary election at the end of 1992. Rodriguez, after recovering from this terrible disappointment, said, “I'll hand pick a successor, I'll arrange the military hierarchy in such a way that I'll continue to have control even when I'm not president, and we'll hand pick a successor.” He chose one of the wealthiest men in the country who had benefitted from the corruption. They held the election, the primary election. Even though they wanted it to be fixed, that didn't quite work and the wrong man won. This was a terrible thing, and they stopped counting; one of the key players in the military told me that they're going to fix the count. They couldn't do it, they had to stop things, just terrible and this was New Year's

Eve at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993. I received someone in the office who said, “The military is going to do a coup, they're going to put in the right person who should have won.” So I inquired around, and confirmed the coup report with four or five people. We contacted the Department and were instructed to approach President Rodriguez and the leading figure in the military General Oviedo and tell them that this should not happen and if it happens we're going to cut off all United States support. We did that, and the Paraguayan military seemed intimidated. In fact, General Oviedo, when we called on him, said, “The only thing I presume is that the United States must be landing troops at the airport.” Finally, the coup didn't occur; however, a statement was made in which the Paraguayan press suggested that the United States was behind the coup. So I issued a public statement that the United States not only did not support a coup but condemned one. The State Department got very upset at this because they said I'd been authorized to make a behind-the-scene approach but not authorized to come out publicly. So I was censured on that, told to stop appearing so much in public. This was still under the Bush presidency.

In the meantime within the ruling party, instead of having a coup, payments were made by the military and the “right man” won the primary nomination. As these events happened, Clinton was inaugurated. They had to move some of the Ambassadors but I was mentioned as one of the people that would stay on.

In Paraguay, the ex-President was sent down to observe the general election. There were some attempts at intimidation but the ruling party sent out some of the Generals who told the people that they would lose their civil service positions if the opposition won. They were able to mobilize what appeared to be a credible majority. The new president-elect was a wealthy man named Juan Carlos Wasmosy. We had a dinner with him to talk about the narcotic trafficking problem. He said, even though Rodriguez had played a clear role in his victory, he was prepared to cooperate with the United States and crack down on the narcotic trafficking. No one would be out of reach. We of course welcomed that. He also mentioned to me that he was going to change the military so that Rodriguez'

hold on the military would be removed. He was inaugurated. The Administration sent down Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala. They had a nice meeting. Everything looked like it was moving along. President Wasmosy told us that, not only would he crack down but he'd allow the United States to choose the new drug czar. We gave him three names, and he chose an honest General. Things for the first hundred days looked very good and the new drug czar was starting to investigate a lot of really high level involvement.

It looked like a very promising situation, but one day the President called me over to his house. (It's right across the street from our compound.) He told me, “You know something strange, there's an officer out here from the counter narcotics directorate that says they're starting to investigate me and General Oviedo.” I said, “Well, I could possibly understand Oviedo but I'm sure he's probably not investigating you Mr. President.” He said, “You check.” I checked, they were looking at the military and Oviedo but not particularly the President. The President said, “Fine, we continue.” Then a few weeks later he called me again, he said, “You know this drug czar we put in there is talking to my opponents within the ruling party.” So I checked it out through the DEA,” and told him, “No it's not true.” I said, “Mr. President why don't we have a meeting in the Palace, we'll have your military advisor, you, let's bring in the drug czar, you can ask him anything you want.” He did and he said, “Are you meeting people in the oppositions?” He said “Absolutely not, Mr. President, I'm a hundred percent behind you.” So the President said, in my presence, “I can tell you that no one here is immune. You investigate, you have total freedom of action.” He said, “That's fine.” So three weeks passed and the President called me up, he said, “You know, I'd like you and Francesca, your wife, to join me and the Ambassador of Brazil and the Papal Nuncio on a special family occasion. We're going to fly to the southern part of Paraguay where we're going to a monastery where my son is buried. He died at 17 prematurely; we'd like you to participate with me in a Mass. It was really an intimate family occasion. We flew down there and it was a terribly moving thing, the President's wife produced these letters from their son and there was crying. We visited

his grave, then we went to this little airport to board the President's plane and somebody ran over to me and showed me a piece of newspaper. The article said the Deputy head of the counter drug forces had been removed. I said, “Mr. President, please explain.” He said, “Not to worry. I'll explain to you when we get back to Asuncion.” We went back and the following day they removed not only the deputy but also the head drug czar. We held a country team meeting and said, “What should we do? This shouldn't take place with the United States remaining silent.” The press came up to me at an event during the day and I said, “It's a pity if honest people are being removed.” So, of course, they went to the President. They had this mammoth headline “The American Ambassador doesn't rule, we rule.” A very nationalist reaction of course. I was called into the foreign ministry. The State Department asked, “What are you doing?” I said, “You have to make this public.”

President Wasmosy next said to me, “Not to worry, we're going to name an honest man.” For example, he said, “I have this other man named Rodriguez, another civilian, perhaps he could be named drug czar.” I said, “Mr. President, this man was a campaign advisor to one of the leading traffickers in the country, the Governor of the Eastern Province.” Wasmosy said, “Not to worry, we'll get someone else.” So he came to me about a week later and said, “How about my private secretary?” I said, I'd be happy to look into it. He said, “Please do.” We looked into it and it turned out that this man not only had been involved in illegal money transactions but he had represented an airline which belonged to one of the members of the Cali cartel. I said, “Mr. President you can't name persons associated with a cartel as a drug czar.” “Not to worry, we'll do it again.” About a week later, he produced the name of a retired General who we knew was close to the head of the armed forces. But we had nothing against him in the drug area. The State Department, in the meantime, was calling up and saying, “You're interfering in this young democracy.” Wasmosy's nominee Ramon Rosa Rodriguez was made drug czar but it turned out he was killed about nine months later. In any event, that's how we got a new drug czar and, of course, progress on drugs really stopped. When all this happened we of course sent in a yearly drug report on status, and we mentioned this.

There was some progress earlier in the year but it turned sour at year-end when the honest drug czar was removed. This is all happening, we sent this in and in February 1993, I was called up to Washington to be interviewed for the position of Vice President of the National Defense University. The Assistant Secretary at the time, Alexander Watson, called me in. Also in the room was Michael Skol, the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Watson said, “I have to tell you we received complaints from the Paraguayan government about your conduct, your constant confrontation with the President. On this drug czar thing, you had another confrontation. You're in constant confrontation there. We considered this and we decided we should curtail your term. You should be there until July, instead we want you out of there by April 1.” I said, “Who authorized this?” They said, “We told 'them' you're going to be out of there.” I said, “You know it's going to be sort of hard to pack, may take a few extra months.” Watson said, “Just you and your family should be out of there by April 1.” I was upset. I must admit I thought I'd done a great job and here I was being sacked in fact, on the basis of complaints from the Paraguayan government. I said, “Have you looked into this carefully? Do you know what this General Oviedo is about? Do you know anything about the drugs, that we tried to get rid of Rodriguez because of the drug issue?” Skol and Watson said, “No, drugs is not a problem. Paraguay has no trafficking.” I proceeded back to Paraguay to pack my bags. This was in mid February, I was leaving in a month and a half. On April 1st, the annual Presidential certification thing comes out and Paraguay is certified and not only that, the report that comes out is our report that we sent in minus all the negatives. They removed all the negatives. So I sent a cable to Strobe Talbot who I knew a little bit. I said, “Mr. Deputy Secretary, this is based on our report, except you eliminated all the negatives and I think that on a Presidential certification that's not the thing to do.” Then comes back a cable, “We took this into account.”

Q: Did you ever determine the exact approximate reasons that thPresident sacked all those people?

GLASSMAN: No, why he sacked the drug people?

Q: Yes.

GLASSMAN: Oh yes, they were getting too close to General Oviedo, the man who by the way continues to be a very important man in Paraguay. He later, after my departure, attempted to precipitate a coup in Paraguay and the President took refuge in the American Ambassador's house. Finally President Clinton and the OAS Secretary General intervened and helped block the coup.

Q: Grim tale?

GLASSMAN: Yes, the bad part of the tale was thaWashington at least at that early stage was ready to go along with emissaries from people who are obviously corrupt and also tied with narco trafficking. In the Department, I tried to find out who authorized my dismissal and I've never been told. I went to the Director General of the Foreign Service and gave a memo describing the scene which I told you about and she said, “We don't know who authorized this. You should asAlexander Watson.” I doubt they did know although somebody mentioned somebody in the White House might have put out a word that this had gone on long enough.

Q: Bureaucratically, presumably, the predecessor of Gelbard aninternational narcotics was not a player in all this.

GLASSMAN: No, later Gelbard told me that year they'd certified Paraguay, the following years they would not certify Paraguay. To his credit, my successor, Bob Service, in the next two years, reported accurately on their absence of cooperation and they were given a waiver but they were not certified. What alarmed me was the fact that an Embassy report, the only source of information, was selectively edited to convey an erroneous impression for Presidential certification which is not a good thing.

Q: So you landed back in Washington in 1994 and did you go immediately to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces?

GLASSMAN: I spent my first three months after being sent back here in the Historian's Office in the bowels of Columbia Plaza. I had the good fortune of reviewing some of the material on the Cuban Missile Crisis to declassify. There was an interlude and then I was sent over to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. An article appeared in The Washington Post saying that I'd been sent to Siberia for whatever controversy had been aroused in Paraguay. I started off there and I taught political science for about two years and I received a call one day from a fellow colleague, Ambassador Darryl Johnson, who was involved as a deputy for international coordination on the Bosnia Train and Equip program.

At the time of the Dayton Accords, the Administration in order to please the Republican members of Congress who objected to our arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslim had agreed lead an international effort to arm the Bosnian federation. Darryl asked if I would be willing to replace him. I said I would do so. I went over there in April 1996. Upon my arrival we found that the Congress had agreed to provide a $100,000,000 dollars of United States drawdown military equipment for the armed forces but no real achievements had been realized yet in terms of gathering international funds. They had a donors conference in Ankara which Strobe Talbot, the Deputy Secretary, attended but there were no pledges. Second of all they had no bank account for any pledges they received, so first I contacted the Treasury Department. They worked out a mechanism whereby foreign government donors would be able to put money in the United States Treasury similar to the Foreign Military Sales account the Saudis and others have. Our innovation was that the donor governments would be allowed to maintain title to their funds. We would never take title to funds, meaning that wouldn't require congressional legislation since we never would own the funds and nor would the Bosnians. At this point, we sent out some presidential letters and Mack McCarty, one of the White House advisors, went out one weekend to

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates and got some pledges. Our pledges finally totaled $147,000,000 dollars. Then we, of course, engaged in intensive follow-up effort to secure the deposits in cash in the United States Treasury. We designed a system whereby we would exchange notes with the donor country establishing these accounts and we established a system whereby the Bosnians would request a purchase. They would sign a contract or purchase services such as training and we would then convey these to individual donors and they would decide whether or not they wished to use their money for this purpose. This turned out to work very well indeed. We secured a full 100 percent funding of pledges and never had any serious refusal in terms of cooperation. We then had to figure out a way in which we could buy military equipment which had to be inexpensive. The Bosnians' advisors had told them to buy NATO equipment but this was much too expensive for the amount of funds gathered. We were concerned the Eastern Europeans, particularly those of Orthodox religion, would back the Serbs and not agree to sell arms to Bosnia. We had resistance to overcome. But, through various trips, we were able to get the Ukranian government to agree, the Romanian government to agree, Slovak government, Turkey, Egypt to agree to supply things. Then we helped the Bosnians negotiate contracts, and submitted them to the donor states who agreed to fund them. We have an ongoing policy now in which all but 30 million dollars have been disbursed and the Bosnians are much more capable than they were before.

Q: Does the program continue and do you have a successor?

GLASSMAN: Right, I was replaced by a man named Steve Geis. The head of the program is a fellow named Jim Purdew, a civil servant. They are going to see whether they are going to raise some more funds, which is critical. The interesting thing politically is this program, which the CIA believes is a bad program, because it has created a threat to stability rather than a reinforcement of stability, while the Pentagon also dislikes it because they want to be even-handed. All this is a one sided program and Western Europeans, who are leaning very much toward the Serb side, also oppose it. We can sustain the program simply due to the fact that there is an emotional attachment to the Bosnians,

victims of aggression, and because the White House promised the Republicans that they would do this.

Q: What is the attitude of the Croatians considering that it'technically a Federation armed force?

GLASSMAN: The Federation, of course, is made up of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. They've been willing to go along because they also fear a Serb renewal of aggression. Bosnia is landlocked, so we have to bring in our heavy equipment through the Croatian port of Ploce. The Islamic states did not really want to help the Croatians because they knew that the Croatians at one point attacked the Muslims. They feel no loyalty towards them. What we'd do is tell the donors that the federation concept is necessary. We need access to those Croatian ports. In the period before the United States entered the game, Iran was the backer of Bosnia. They never were able to bring in one tank, but we brought in dozens of tanks, lots of ammunition. It's essential to have Croatia on-side to allow that kind of equipment to be brought in. In the event of war, of course, you don't want a two front war with the Serbs attacking on one side, Croats on the other, so its important to keep them on board. So we designed an armed forces structure within Bosnia so that the Bosnia Croat units get a substantial portion, about one third of the assistance.

Q: I'm struck by how much of your career involved the Cold War either directly in relationships with the Soviet Union or more indirectly in other parts of the world and I'm also struck by the extent of your contact with and working with some of the great men of the period. Do you have any valedictory comments about these common threads or other aspects of your career as a whole?

GLASSMAN: The Cold War was a great organizer and inspirer in a sense that we knew where the enemy was. We saw attempts to reduce tension such as Kissinger's detente early in the 1970s and we saw the limits of that as the Soviets began to press their imperial efforts. It was a great opportunity to participate in these historical events. As you

see, in the post-Cold War world, things like Bosnia become inherently more controversial because U.S. equities are confused and also our instruments for influencing become more limited. Before, we could count on congressional appropriations for the armed forces or the Agency to fund their efforts. Now international donations are increasingly necessary. These are inherently both limited in quantity and also require a different kind of justification. I don't think we've adequately coped with or understood what that involves. In terms of the decision making structure and people participating in it, the thing that obviously rings out is that we have had a conflict with our apparatus as we did with the players on the outside. Maybe because America's a rich country, we can afford duplicating bureaucracies and functions and competing players. That might be a good thing and perhaps, in a sense of free market of ideas, good comes out of it but my reflection is that I've seen a lot more time wasted on internecine warfare than what was necessary or functional. I think it's clear that some redesign of the way we do policy to some more orderly system would be in order. All the Foreign Service Officers and people from other agencies with whom I worked obviously dedicated their lives to our country's service. You wonder, however, if the result of their efforts were perhaps as great as they might have been if there were another way of doing business. That's my brief commentary.

Q: Thank you, Ambassador Glassman.

End of interview